We assembled a novel dataset recording detailed information of more than 30 thousand polling booths. From each polling booth we get not only the electoral outcomes but also the partisan affiliation of the domestic observers. We exploit a natural experiment that randomly matches the observers to the voters and we identify electoral fraud caused by the observers. We find that 4 out of 7 parties have engaged in fraudulent strategies, accounting for an illegitimate increase of as much as 7% of the vote count, for some parties.
1 Introduction.
Electoral rules are known to influence election results, but there are other less studied rules and procedures that may may also have a tipping effect in elections. Media regulation, spending or advertising limits, registration rules, and voting and monitoring procedures are examples of such rules. In particular, the primal monitoring tasks are carried during the election by electoral officials and observers who are not necessarily neutral and they may attempt to slant the electoral results. Precisely, exploiting a quasi-random assignment of voters to polling stations in Argentina, we show that electoral observers systematically bias the results toward their preferred party.
More generally, identifying the effect of the poll officials (the electoral authority at the polling station) and the observers is a difficult task: not only their preferences may be unobservable, but also they may try to conceal their effect since it could be an illegitimate influence. However, we construct a unique dataset that matches the partisan affiliation of the electoral observers with the election results at each polling station and we make use of a quasi-natural experiment to identify party-specific effects of the observers on the outcomes.
Whether legitimate or not, the strength of the bias is heterogeneous across parties, regions and electoral contests. For instance, while for some political parties we do not find any effect, for others it can be as large as 7%; but for all parties the effects are stronger in the poor and more densely populated regions. Moreover, regional electoral conditions drive these results since the local challengers and runner-ups show the largest effects.
Nonetheless, not all these biases are necessarily the result of electoral fraud since the observers could be using lawful instruments to alter the outcomes. For instance, the observers could be auditing the vote count or helping to resolve classification issues, only when their intervention benefits their own party. In order to shed light on the possible mechanisms, we also explore whether the traditional gimmicks of fraud could also explain our results. In this regard, we find that ballot stuffing is not consistent with our evidence.
For the purposes of this paper, the focus on the 2011 Presidential and National Legislative elections in Argentina allows us to identify the effect of the partisan observers in a convincing way. On the one hand, within a neighborhood, voters are assigned to polling booths, or electoral tables, alphabetically. Hence, while any two polling booths in the same neighborhood are ex-ante ideologically identical, the assignment of the electoral observersthe treatment-is orthogonal to the voters' first letter of the last names. On the other hand, since there are more than 30 thousand polling booths, not all political parties can have an observer in each table. Hence, there is enough variation in the number and the affiliation of 3 the partisan observers within neighborhood across tables. By exploiting these characteristics of the dataset, we can overcome the difficulties in identifying, detecting and measuring the causal effect of observers on the electoral outcomes.
The presence of this bias is not innocuous. Since the partisan observers are the ones introducing this bias in favor of their own parties, the logic of accountability is weakened, possibly altering the politico-economic equilibrium. Therefore, the politicians incentives to be well-behaved may be reduced, they can choose policies that do not conform to the voters will or they may just incur in corruption and other bad practices (xxxx) . Unfortunately, our results may be pervasive in a large number of democracies, not only because partisan observers are at the cornerstone of the electoral monitoring, but also because electoral officials presumably have partisan preferences as well.
Literature.
2 Institutional Background and Data.
Our dataset, hand-coded from raw forms, is unique because the possibility of a clean identification strategy, but Argentina's electoral rules and electoral management are widely spread across other countries. The US is the only presidential regime which does not use a direct electoral system (?).
Electoral rules. Argentina is a presidential democracy with a lower chamber (deputies) and a Senate. The President is directly elected by the popular voter (instead of an electoral college) using the majority rule with runoff. With the exception of the United States, all presidential regimes use a direct electoral rule (??). In Argentina, unless the winner of the first round obtains a qualified majority of 45% or a simple majority above 40% and a 10% winning margin, the first two candidates compete in a second round. 1 Simultaneously, national legislators are chosen: deputies are elected using proportional representation and senators are chosen by plurality rule (3 senators by province: 2 from the party with the largest share and 1 from the runner-up).
How to cast a vote: the electoral table. As it is the norm worldwide, citizens vote in a pre-assigned voting precinct, in which the polling stations and booths are located. In Argentina, the voting precincts are usually schools, and within them, voters are directed 1 In other countries these two figures may vary. 4 to an also pre-assigned polling station. At the polling station, the voter shows proof of his identity and he forms in line to proceed to vote in the unique polling booth linked to that polling station. Notice that the precincts are schools, the polling booths are the classrooms, and the polling station is a table right outside each classroom, on which the ballot box stands, and at which all the poll workers sit. The ballot papers used to cast a secret vote are inside the polling booth, so no one can see the choice of the voter. As the polling booths and stations are unique identifiers of the same "space", we will use those terms interchangeably with "electoral tables". Hence, the voting procedure is the following: a citizen approaches the electoral authorities at the polling station, she shows her identification and she is handed a signed envelope (1 and 2 in figure 1). After that, she enters the closed classroom, the booth, where each party had placed its own ballot papers with its candidate written on it (3 in figure   1 , and see example of paper ballot in figure 5) . The voter chooses a ballot paper, she puts it in the envelope she was given, and she exits the room. Then she introduces the envelope in the ballot box and leaves the polling station with her ID card (4 in figure 1).
Figure 1: Extracted from ?
Electoral authorities and observers. At each polling booth or table, there are electoral authorities and (domestic) observers. The authorities (a "president" and a substitute), in charge of the administration of the election in that particular polling booth, are elected randomly from a pool of alphabetized citizens who live in the same municipality in which the table is located. In terms of the political science literature, they are neutral administrators of 5 the election. Also, political parties can assign domestic observers, "non-neutral" monitors, to a particular electoral table, within a school, within a municipality. The rights and duties of the poll workers and the observers are well established in the electoral code (Codigo Nacional Electoral ). On the one hand, the authorities' main duties are setting up the ballot papers at the beginning of the electoral day, checking the voters identity, and counting the votes.
On the other hand, the observers are responsible for making sure that the ballot papers of their party are available during the whole electoral day. Besides, they have standard monitoring tasks: they must verify that the elections are "properly managed", they are allowed to challenge the authorities' classification of a vote and they can also challenge the voters' identity 2 . In particular, they can monitor the voting outcome, but they are not allowed to count the votes themselves.
Notice that although the electoral authorities might have preferences over the voting outcome, they are supposed to act as neutral monitors. Nonetheless, we do not observe their preferences. On the other hand, the observers are identified with a party, hence we observe their preferences.
The partisan observers must present a "permit" from the party at the beginning of the electoral day, that allows them to represent their party in a given polling booth within a school and an electoral district (see figure 3 ). However, once the election begins, all partisan identifications are prohibited during the day of the election. Thus, citizens do not necessarily know the observers' affiliation. 3 .
Legitimate influence and electoral fraud. The rights and duties of the non-neutral observers also determine the opportunities for biasing the results. An instructions manual for domestic observers written in 2011 and endorsed by most opposition parties by 2013 establishes that the goal of the observers is to avoid electoral fraud 4 : besides checking the voters' IDs, the non-neutral monitors must prevent: 2 There are 4 types of non-positive votes: blank, invalid and challenged votes and IDs. 3 Neither unaffiliated citizens nor affiliated ones can show up to the elections as observers without the party permit. According to the "Manual de Capacitacion para Fiscales de Mesas Electorales", administered by the "Justicia Nacional Electoral" of the Judicial power, the observers must provide their party affiliation at the time of signing the electoral report of each polling booth. Also, there can only be one domestic observer per party, except for the cases where the head of observers of a party overlaps with a "regular" one of that same party: "En la elección en sí misma actúan los Fiscales de Mesa, que controlan una mesa determinada desde su apertura hasta la confeccin de las actas, los certificados y el telegrama con los resultados de la mesa; y los Fiscales Generales, que además de tener las mismas atribuciones que los fiscales de mesa cumplen la función de coordinar sus tareas. Usted entra en la primera de estas dos categorías de fiscal." 4 Page 79, of the booklet circulated with the name "Ser Fiscal", originally endorsed by the ARI-CC and endorsed by 10 parties in 2013: http://www.redserfiscal.com.ar/online/index.php/quienes-somos/partidosfirmantes.
2. the possibility of vote and turnout buying (for instance through chain voting or intimidation), and 3. the stealing of the ballot papers of their party.
The last point is a direct consequence of the observers' responsibility for the ballot papers .
After setting up the table at the beginning of the day, the poll workers are not responsible for anything related to the ballot papers, except for letting the observer at the polling table know that they are missing. It would be up to the authorities will to take any other measure to address the problem, as letting observers in contiguous tables know that there is a shortage of their ballot papers. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that at the beginning of the day, each polling booth is filled with enough ballot papers for all the citizens voting in that table to be able to cast their vote for each party.
The electoral rules have two opposing effects on the incentives for manipulating the results. On the one hand, since the President and the legislators are elected directly by the popular vote, any two votes are equally valuable, independently of their geographic origin (conditional that they are from the same province, in the case of legislators, which is the case in our sample). Therefore, in principle all tables could be targeted. On the other hand, one could think that the runoff rule would prevent the favorite candidate to engage in corruption if he is expected to obtain the qualified majority in the first round. 5 But more importantly, the runoff rule also gives a large payoff to the runner-up, therefore the second and third parties have greater incentives for manipulation, as well.
Political parties.
In the studied national elections, seven parties had presented presidential candidates.
Data and Econometric strategy
In this section we jointly describe the richness of the data, and we explain why it permits a clean identification of the observers' effect on the electoral outcomes.
Data
We assembled a database made of more than 30 thousand polling booths for the 2011 National elections in Argentina (presidential and national legislators). We obtained the polling booth information from two different sources: from the Ministerio del Interior and from the Poder Judicial de la Nacion. From the former, we obtained the electoral data, and the electoral forms that contain the handwritten party affiliations (see an example in figure 4), which have been manually inputed. The electoral authorities from each polling booth must fill this "form", which contains the input for the first vote count and the signature and affiliation of all the individuals present at the vote count. These forms were made public by the Ministerio del Interior for at least a couple of weeks in the 2011 elections in their website, from which we downloaded all the files whose information was later inputed and matched to the electoral information. From the latter source, we obtained the allocation of polling booths into schools, which is needed for identification purposes.
We focus on Buenos Aires province due to the data availability of the partisan affiliation of the observers, however, only the province Buenos Aires, is larger than Italy in area and as large as the state of New Mexico (the fifth larger U.S. state). Therefore, the data used in this paper includes detailed elections information comprising the entire province of Buenos Aires, in Argentina, which is by far the largest electoral district of the country (almost 40% of the population votes there) and is, additionaly, subdivided into 135 municipalities (or departamentos) and 1067 neighborhoods (or circuitos). The 31350 voting tables from which our information is coming from are located in 4166 schools throughout that province (see table 1 ).
In the elections considered in our dataset, there were seven political parties running in the national elections. Out of those, party number 2 was the clear winner in the district with a 56.3% share, followed by party number 5 with 14.9% and party 7 with 10% of the valid votes. However, for the Senate and the lower chamber, the distance between the challengers shortened to 3% and 1% respectively. The results of the remaining parties can be found in non-valid. Importantly for the analysis that will follow, the number of party observers in a given table ranged from zero to eight (for a mean of 2.7). The presence of observers is not 8 uniform across parties. In table 4, we see that party 2 was able to have an observer in 94% of the tables while party six had only an agent in 1.7% of the locations, which makes the identification of party-specific effects for these two parties harder.
Note that some voting forms do not indicate the identity of the observers that were present in that table (or it is unintelligible). This occurs when, for example, an observer signs a form but does not indicate the code of his party below the signature. 6
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Since the main challenge is to quantify any bias that the election results may have from the presence of an election observer, we start that endeavour with comparing the simple average results of each party in those tables where it allocated a party agent and comparing those with the results in the other tables. Figure 2 shows clearly that presence of an observer and the results of that party are positively correlated. Nonetheless, to separate any causal effect from selection (maybe observers are easier to find in areas with higher support), we introduce our regression analysis.
INSERT TABLE ?? HERE

Econometric strategy
After describing the data and showing some preliminary statistics, our first econometric task is to estimate a causal effect of the presence of a party observer on the number of votes that it obtains. For that we start by running the following baseline regression:
(1) lvotes p,t,n = α p,n + γ1 [observerp,t,n>0] + X p,t,n β + p,t,n
In the specification above, lvotes p,t,n is the log of votes obtained by party p in table t, located in neihborhood n. The coefficient of interest is γ which is associated with an indicator function that takes value 1 when an observer from the corresponding party is present. We control for neighborhood×party fixed effects (α p,n ) and other covariates, here represented by the matrix X p,t,n , and explained below.
A positive γ in the equation above means that in tables where there is an observer from a party, that same party obtains a larger vote count than in some other (ex-ante identical) table
where the observer was not present. However, since in this specification we do not distinguish between parties, γ reveals the average effect across parties. For instance, γ = 0.02 implies that the presence of an observer (from any party) increases the vote count for the party of the observer by 2.02% 7 . Nevertheless, the richness of our dataset allows us to account for asymmetric effects through the estimation of γ p for each party p, with the following specification:
(2) lvotes p,t,n = α p,n + γ p 1 [observerp,t,n>0] + X p,t,n β + p,t,n Hence, the seven coefficients have a causal implication from the presence of the observer from a party p to the vote count for that party p, rather than the average.
While it may be clear that non-zero coefficients introduce a bias in the election, the remaining question is to understand whether the source of the bias is necessarily the result of electoral manipulation. For instance, the observers at the table could be monitoring either the electoral authorities behavior (i.e. that they count the votes correctly) or the general electoral process (i.e. that there are enough paper ballots from their party). Fortunately, the implications of each of the possible underlying mechanisms are distinct. Moreover, the latter has also implications on blank or non-valid votes, as if the voters are prevented to vote because of the lack of paper ballots for their preferred party, then they will cast a blank or non-valid vote (or vote for some other party). In order to tell apart these and other possiblem mechanisms, in the main body of the paper we estimate different versions of the specifications above.
Among those, we show that our results are robust to different measures of the dependent variable (sum of votes, percentage of votes, logarithm of votes). Moreover, we also show the effect of observers on turnout, the blank votes, and other non-valid cast ballots. In order to be able to interpret the effect on the votes cleanly, in all cases we also control for "polling booth characteristics", X p,t,n , besides the electoral authorities and observers. For instance, we take into account for the maximum amount of people who can vote in that polling booth (table size) , the turnout (percentage of people who showed up to vote), the total number of properly cast votes, and the total number of observers.
Finally, we can also enrich the models above controlling for those cases where the observer is the only observer in the table. That is, we add a different indicator function that takes value 1 only when that party observer is alone in the table. This means that we use the 7 e γ − 1 10 following variable:
The interpretation of its coefficient is straightforward: on top of the observer effect, γ p , a positive "alone coefficient" adds an extra amount of votes. Therefore, if being alone in the table increases the vote count, we can say that there is electoral fraud, rather unambiguously.
Nonetheless, as with the previous cases, we test new specifications that help us to tell apart legal activities from illegal ones.
Identification
The main difficulty in the identification strategy is to separate geographic and, possibly, ideological heterogeneity from a causal effect of the presence of an observer. Heterogeneity may be unobserved to the econometricians but observed by the party officials that condition the location of its representatives on that information.
Thus, to establish causality, we exploit the alphabetical assignment of voters to polling stations within schools. This means that, within a neighborhood, every school will have the same expected distribution of socio-economic voter characteristics that could drive their political preferences. Therefore, the use of neighborhood×party fixed effects will capture all the information set that the observers can condition its location upon, meaning that we can interpret the estimated effect as causal. Following this strategy, we can establish a causal link between the presence of party observers and their vote count. 8
Notice that our identification is sustained even if parties allocate observers strategically.
On the one hand, even if parties are targeting some neighborhoods according to some observable characteristics (??), our strategy compares tables within the same neighborhood (or school). Hence, the causal effect survives that kind of targeting. On the other hand, parties could allocate observers targeting tables rather than regions. In that case, our identification would be under risk if parties had observed table's characteristics; nonetheless, in 2011, for the first time in history, Argentina's presidential elections were organized in such a way that women and men can vote in the same table. A direct implication is that the composition of tables is new, and that parties cannot infer observed ideological characteristics using results from previous presidential elections. Moreover, in the literature on clientelism is often argued that local party bosses, who could be observers, target individuals rather than polling booths or regions (?, ?). If so, under the existence of party bosses that could also be partisan observers, our strategy would deteriorate only if the party bosses sit in the tables where they had targeted voters only according to the first letter of the last names, which is a very unlikely vote buying strategy. 9
Analysis
In this section we show that the presence of the observers systematically bias the electoral results. First, we estimate the average effect of the observers, which we also break up into party-specific effects to allow for intrinsic party characteristics. Second, we let these effects to change accordingly to their stands in the the local electoral competition and we show that the main effects come from the runner-ups rather than the incumbent. Third, we explore whether certain local socio-economic conditions exacerbate these bias to prove that poorer and more densely populated regions show larger effects than the rich and uninhabited ones.
In the following section, using these results, we investigate possible sources for these biases.
Average and party-specific effects.
Average effect of the observers.
Partisan observers and vote shares are highly correlated, as shown in the first two columns of table 10. The presence of a partisan observer is linked to a 20% increase on the vote share for that party, for all parties. However, this link is not causal, there could be omitted variables that jointly determine the vote shares for a party and the presence of the observer from that party. For instance, in areas with a large support for a party there must also be a higher availability of individuals willing to act as an observer for that same party.
Hence, we introduced a variable that controls for all the unobserved heterogeneity across those areas and across parties. That is, we introduce the neighborhood×party fixed effect described in the previous section. In the remaining columns of the table we estimate the baseline equation 1 with neighborhood×party fixed effects, γ n,p , and school×party fixed effects, γ s,p to correct for the omitted variables bias. The results in columns (3) and (4) In order to give this figures some economic significance, we could see their overall effect in the province of Buenos Aires, where there are more than 10 million voters. In total, according to the figures above, observers could be causing an overall increase of more than 125 thousand votes (for their respective parties).
Party-specific effects.
The previous estimations show the effects of observer presence averaged by party. Since it is likely that parties behaved differently, we also study these effects separately. This is done by interacting the observer information with a dummy that indicates to which party belong the votes. The results of these specifications are shown in table 15.
The results are stronger for parties 1, 3 and 5, which in the simple regression in table 15. exhibit effects of 6%, 2% and 2% on the party's votes, respectively. The effects do not change neither after adding controls like the alone p,t dummy (column 2) or the percentage of turnout in the table (column 3), nor using a different fixed effect (neighborhood instead of school).
Worth noticing is the effect of the alone coefficient: being the only observer in the table would add a further 4.8% of votes for party 3. Thus, the overall effect is more than thrice the baseline (6.7% instead of 1.9%). Neither controlling for turnout (measured in percentage units), which has a strong explanatory power, nor controlling for table size (the number of potential voters) reduces the coefficients of interest. 10
Political experience.
Above we show that some parties are more prone to bias the electoral results than others.
However, besides taking into account the party identity, we investigate whether the electoral competition affects the observers behavior. While our data contains national elections, municipal elections were taking place simultaneously. Hence, we use the aggregated results by municipality, and the results from previous elections at the municipal level, to obtain the expected position of the parties in that local electoral context. Following this strategy is not only interesting, but also convenient since, as we show in tables ?? and ??, now we have enough variability in the data to be able to identify effects for most parties (including the local expected winner and the incumbent).
Before going into the details, it is noteworthy that the ballot papers structure unambiguously discourages split-ticket voting (see figure 5 ). Suppose that a voters wants to vote for party X in all elections but party Y for major, she would have to manually cut two ballot papers (party X and Y), in four different sections. Thus, besides the ideological and theoretical motives for coattail voting (see ? and ?), our setup incentivizes an even more direct link between the local electoral competition and the national electoral results.
Incumbency effects. Whether the incumbent mayor is running for reelection or no, he may have an incentive to support his own party to win the municipal (and national) election.
Hence, we split the observers between those working for the incumbents party and those challenging them.
As we can see in table ? ? the results show that the incumbents observers have no effect on their own vote count, but the challengers do. This implies that all the effect of the average observer effects come from the challenging parties (around 1.4%). The last two columns of the table control for local electoral incentives showing the results for when the elections were close. Unfortunately, although the effect is positive, we do not have enough data to make inferences for the close elections estimations. Nonetheless, the results for the non-close elections help us understand that, most likely, the incumbent party had no incentives to increase their own party shares further, since the elections were not very close (ie. all the elections were won by a 10% difference or more in all but 2 municipalities).
INSERTA TABLES ?? AND ?? HERE?
These results are consistent with this presidential election with runoff since parties are competing for two positions: the leader and the runner-up. While the leading party aims to obtain a majority of the votes to avoid the second round, the other parties do not only want to prevent that, but they also compete for being the first minority, in order to access the second round.
Experienced incumbents. In the previous paragraph, implicitly,
The same exercise could be done for experienced incumbents (re-elected before) versus nonexperienced ones (never re-elected before).
INSERT Socio-economic determinants.
On the one hand, we have shown that the bias determined by the observers presence depends on the political environment. That is, whether legitimate or not, the electoral conditions might be shaping the observers behavior. We can think of those conditioning factors as demand-driven: the more a party cares about the electoral results, the more the observers would attempt to bias the elections. On the other hand, the municipalities socio-economic conditions of the electorate could be also influencing the magnitude of this bias. The individual characteristics could make biasing the results less costly. Following this reasoning, we can think of the socio-economic conditioning factors as supply-driven.
Therefore, we slice our sample according to characteristics that may make the introduction of such bias cheaper. For instance, in the clientelism literature, it has been argued that the observers could be the enforcing mechanism of vote buying contracts, which tend to be targeted in poor regions, less densely populated and with a higher share of patronage ( (??????). Therefore, we look at these three particular slides of the sample.
Poverty.
In first place, using the data from the national census from 2010, we compute a measure of extreme poverty for each municipality, using the unsatisfied basic needs data (NBI). Then, we look at the median level of these index, and we split the sample in two. As we can see in table ? ?, it is noticeable that all the coefficients for the party-specific effects are stronger than in the baseline model in table ? ?. More noticeable, for party 1, which traditionally portrays itself as an institutional anti-corruption party, the observers have no effect anymore.
On the other hand, party 3, the traditional "political machine in the province according the political science literature (?), and party 5, the runner-up, show larger coefficients, they get 2.7% and around 4% extra votes when their observers are present, respectively.
Electoral density.
In second place, following up on ?, we look at less densely populated districts. In this case, we split the sample again: the neighborhoods with a large number of schools are inhabited enough for an independent electoral judge to determine the more than one school is needed.
Contrary to this, in neighborhoods not so populated, the electoral justice would determine that fewer schools are needed. Moreover, if there is a "geographic boundary that impedes citizens from one part of the neighborhood to access the polling place on the other side, the electoral judge, rather than opening a new school, has to split the neighborhood in two. Hence, computing the "electoral density of a neighborhood by counting the number of schools is a better instrument than just counting the population. As with poverty, we split the sample roughly in two halves, and we show that all the party-specific effects, and the political determinants (incumbent vs. challengers), come from the more densely populated regions. The results can be seen in tables ?? and 26, where the first three columns show the results for the low density neighborhoods, and the last three show the results for the high density municipalities. It is noticeable that the only party that has a robust effect, even in the less densely populated neighborhoods, is party 3. 11
Public employment.
Using the share of public employees relative to the active population by municipality, we intend to split the sample accordingly and see whether there is a differential effect. Unfortunately, the data we have is very outdated.
Mechanisms
In this section, we explore the plausible mechanisms underlying these effects. In principle, since many parties increase their vote count by introducing an observer, the next logical question might be which parties are the ones losing votes, if any. Therefore, we show that although there does not seem to exist cross-effects (i.e. there are no parties that systematically "steal" votes from other parties), there is strong evidence that the parties with observers gain votes in detriment of the ones without. Moreover, we show that only one party, the national incumbent has a strong effect on the non-positive votes. That is, only when there is an observer from that party 2, the number of blank votes increases. And last, we show that none of the parties have an effect on turnout.
Cross-effects.
In table 27 we see that although most of the cross-effects seem to be negative, none of the effects are strong enough to conclude that one particular party has a negative effect on other party. In the same table, we can see that all the own-effects are of the same magnitude of the baseline regressions. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the parties with observers do not only have a positive effect on their own vote count, but also have a strong and negative effect on the votes of the parties without observers, as shown in table ? ?. That is, the observers at a given table have two simultaneous effects, they increase the vote count of the parties with observers partly in detriment of the parties without observers, at that table, independently of the party identity.
Non-positive votes. As we mentioned earlier, we can also see whether the partisan observers have an effect on the non-positive votes: that is, on blank, non-valid, and challenged votes (either through challenging the authorities classification or the voters identity). 12 In table ? ? we group all the non-positive votes, and we show that only the presence of party 2 has a positive effect of around 3%. Although the observers are entitled to challenge any vote unilaterally, we do not find any robust effect on the challenged votes, but on the blank votes (table ?? ). More particularly, only the presence of an observer from party 2 has a causal effect on these type of votes.
Turnout.
Most of the literature on electoral fraud posits that one of the main mechanisms of corruption is that of ballot stuffing (?, ?, ?) . A direct consequence of such strategy would be an increased turnout as the officials would be artificially increasing the number of citizens that have shown up to vote for their party. On the other hand, a growing literature on clientelism poses that turnout buying or mobilization is key for the challenger to win an election (? and references therein). Since in Argentina voting is mandatory, we should not expect any effect in our sample. Nonetheless we find a small but significant causal effect for party 3 and 1 on the percentage of registered voters that show up to vote (0.17% and 0.7% respectively), but these effects are not robust, as we can see in columns 4 to 6 in table ? ?.
Discussion of possible underlying illegitimate mechanisms
In the previous sections we show that partisan domestic observers influence the outcome of elections. On average, the presence of an observer increases 1.2% the vote count of his party.
However, since not all parties behave in the same way, we split the effect between parties and we show that party 1, 3 and 5 are the ones engaging in electoral misconduct. The respective effects for each party were estimated of 6%, 2% and 2%, meaning that if, for instance, party 1 has an observer in a given polling booth, then party 1's total votes will increase 6% ceteris paribus.
Either pre-electoral or (some) interim strategies are possible even under the surveillance of other observers. Since one of the main concerns in Argentine elections is the "stealing of paper ballots", we analyze this one first. The paper ballots of a party, say party X, could be missing because of at least one of the following: (1) the observer of the party X never allocated the paper ballots in the polling booth, (2) a voter or an observer of the parties other than X stole the ballots. In either cases, even if the observers of parties other than X are not responsible for re-allocating new paper ballots, they could cooperate in the restitution or the awareness of new paper ballots. Moreover, the systematic stealing of the paper ballots from one party, even if they are replaced, would reduce the vote count for that party as the replacement is not immediate. 13 Therefore, the direct consequences of such strategy are two: first, the number of votes for that party X is reduced, and second, the non-positive votes (blank and non-valid) increases. If an observer is "stealing papers", his number of votes should not increase due to his presence, but the non-positive votes should increase.
If an observer is "avoiding being stolen paper ballots", his number of votes should increase due to his presence, and the number of non-positive votes should decrease (as compared to tables without his presence). That is, our evidence is consistent with ballot paper stealing, particularly from party 2, the only party that has an effecton blank votes.
Finally, in order to evaluate whether vote and turnout buying are consistent with our findings, we need to clarify these concepts. Turnout buying can take place by mobilizing citizens who otherwise would not have voted, while vote buying takes place through persuading a voter (who would have turned out to vote anyway) to vote for your party. 14 Both these strategies are possible under the presence of other observers because, although half the contract has taken place before the election the other half occurs the day of the election:
either showing up to vote, or voting. While for an observer is easy to monitor turnout, he cannot monitor how the citizen has voted. Nevertheless, his presence at the polling booth could be a gentle (or intimidating) reminder of the implicit contract between the voter and the observer (i.e. the patron in the clientelism literature). In this sense, these strategies are a complement to targeting citizens who are likely to comply the contract (?).
Since we have already shown that vote buying is not taking place, we are left with vote buying as the remaining strategy -and still consistent with our results: observers monitor that they get votes from voters who would otherwise have voted for other parties. As pointed in ?, ???, there are different ways to influence the voters behavior at the pol using illegitimate instruments, such as creating (even artificial) beliefs of violations of the voter secrecy. However, in these stories, when the ballots are casted secretly, it is still unclear why the citizens who are "bought" would still vote as suggested by the terms of the informal transaction, instead of voting for their preferred candidate, or blank. In the literature, two mechanisms are proposed: either voters feel psychologically constrained by their verbal 13 Some anecdotal evidence suggest that when a voter denounces the absence of the paper ballots from one of the parties, the current authorities and observers would tell the voter: "You cannot vote for that party here!" 14 Therefore, these would be effective vote buying and turnout buying, as in ?.
19 agreement, or their votes are likely to be somehow monitored. Our argument lies in between these two:ven if monitoring of each individual vote does not take place, if voters "perceive" that their vote might be monitored, that would provide extra incentives to the citizen to behave as previously agreed on. As ?, ??? point out, these are not new strategies in Argentine electoral politics to the most prominent parties in Argentina, as it is the case of party 3, for instance. 15
Extensions, counterfactuals and robustness checks
In this section we address the most salient issues that could undermine our results, and we show that rather that preventing us from proving the presence of fraud, they reinforce the story and they point to new avenues of research.
TO BE COMPLETED.
Placebo
We run a regression where instead of studying the effect of the observer of the TO BE COMPLETED.
Conclusion
In the last decades of the 20th century there was big shift toward democratic regimes.
Even countries traditionally believed to be autocracies or dictatorships have experienced a transition toward elections. However, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to suspect that some of those elections could have been biased, manipulated or rigged, knocking down the logic of electoral accountability.
toral manipulation in the 2011 presidential elections in Argentina, by exploiting the random assignment of voters to tables. Through a natural experiment we get clean results without making assumptions about how turnout, digits distribution, or ideological distribution should look like, as in most electoral forensics studies. That is, we show that the presence of a partisan monitor in a given table within a school increases the amount of votes for the party of that observer in that table with respect to the tables without an observer.
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Figures
The percentages represented in the bars represent the shares out of the total votes of the 7 main parties. Overall our data includes all the 31315 voting tables in the Buenos Aires district. However, some of them do not have information regarding the presence or not of a party observer. The column "Tables" represents the number of tables, for each party, for which we have data on the presence of an observer (that is, we know whether the observer from that party was there or not). The column "fraction" is the ratio of "Tables with an observer" to the "Tables" column. Table size 1.03 * * * 1.03 * * * 0.0050 * * * 0.0050 * * * -2.10 * * 0.97 * * * 0.064 * * * (0.049) (0.049) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.88) (0.0076) (0.011) Turnout 0.020 * * * 0.020 * * * 0.00053 * * * 0.00053 * * * (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.000054) (0.000054) Electoral Authority -0.020 * -0.00078 * * 0.18 * * 0.18 * * 0.0018 0.0022 * * -0. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses
Municipalities with number of households with in the poorest quintile * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
(3) (4) (5) (6) log of votes log of votes log of votes log of votes log of votes log of votes observer 0.016 * * * 0.019 * * * 0.015 * * * 0.017 * * * (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0043) delegadoXsmall -0.012 * -0.012 -0.0093 * -0.0094 (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0056) (0.0065) delegXincumb -0.021 * * * -0.0023 -0.016 * * 0.00077 (0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0056) delegXincumbXsmall 0.0031 -0.0085 0.0035 -0.0059 (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.0090) delegXchalleng 0.019 * * * 0.017 * * * (0.0043) (0.0043) delegXchallengXsmall -0.012 -0.0094 (0.0074) (0.0065) total observers -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0013 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) autoridad 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) lvalidos 0.86 * * * 0.86 * * * 0.86 * * * (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) Constant 3.09 * * * 3.09 * * * 3.09 * * * -1.73 * * * -1.73 * * * -1.73 * * * (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0 
A small neighborhood is defined as a neiborhood with 8 or less schools * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Observer Party 1 0.068 * * -0.013 -0.00089 0.0050 -0.00098 0.017 0.0093 (0.027) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.019) Observer Party 2 -0.011 -0.0021 0.0074 -0.0076 -0.0016 0.0074 -0.0071 (0.018) (0.0081) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) Observer Party 3 -0.0099 -0.0068 0.023 * * 0.0082 -0.00082 0.0082 0.0056 (0.016) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.010) (0.0095) (0.014) (0.010) Observer Party 4 -0.010 -0.00076 0.024 * -0.0041 -0.021 0.0100 -0.019 (0.026) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017) Observer Party 5 0.0058 -0.0048 0.0079 -0.0032 0.025 * * -0.0036 -0.0011 (0.020) (0.0088) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) Observer Party 6 -0.0095 -0.030 -0.036 -0.029 -0.022 -0.020 -0.035 (0.042) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.035) (0.030) Observer Party 7 -0.0041 -0.0064 0.00038 -0.0041 -0.00058 0.026 * * 0.011 (0.015) (0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) Turnout 0.0082 * * * 0.040 * * * 0.013 * * * 0.013 * * * 0.019 * * * 0.010 * * * 0.015 * * * (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0029) Total Observers 0.00073 0.00079 -0.0056 0.0032 0.00088 -0.014 -0.0027 (0.010) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0089) (0.0068) Constant 0.91 * * * 1.64 * * * 1.88 * * * 1.88 * * * 2.05 * * * 1.16 * * * Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
